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O \: 'lbl'THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
\C\q°i \1tC. 2 \ 1 . CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
ALAN DA VIS. Special Ad~) lnistrator 
of the.Estate of 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 














Judge Ronald Suster 
Case No. 312322 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE SPECIFIC 
ITEMS OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff hereby moves this Court to deny the motion in limine of the Defendant, State of Ohio, to 
preclude the Plaintiff from mentioning or using specific items of physical evidence. The reasons and 
authorities for denying the Defendant's motion are set forth in the attached brief in support, which is hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
. ilbert (0021948) 
George H. Carr (0069372) 
1700 Standard Building 
13 70 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
--
BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
!. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff intends to introduce two items of physical evidence and the results of tests conducted on 
those objects, and the State has objected to the introduction of these items. 
The first of the two items is a bloodstained wood chip taken from the basement stairs of the Sheppard 
home. This piece of evidence was gathered by Mary Cowan of the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office, and 
was introduced at the 1954 murder trial as State's Exhibit 84. This chip of wood was also included in the 
trace evidence report compiled by the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office for the 1954 trial of Doctor 
Sheppard. When discovered, this exhibit was still marked and preserved in its original glass tube, as it had 
been introduced in the 1954 trial. There are photographs showing the condition and labeling of the item in 
the glass tube at its discovery. The Coroner's office resumed custody of this evidence following its recent 
discovery. 
The second piece of evidence is a bloodstain taken from the door of Marilyn Sheppard's wardrobe. 
This piece of evidence was obtained by Dr. Paul Kirk and his associate Dr. Haas, whose collection of the 
evidence of was witnessed by Reverend Robert Scully. On behalf of the Plaintiff, a laboratory in Berkeley, 
California tested this evidence. In September of 1987, the material was sent to the coroner's office for their 
inspection. At trial, Plaintiff intends to present a prima facie case on the chain of evidence with regards to 
this bloodstain. 
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The Ohio Rules of Evidence require that authentication or identification of evidence take place prior 
to the introduction of the evidence. Ev id. R. 902. Authentication can take place by a number of methods, 
including direct evidence, expert testimony, or circumstantial evidence. In the case of the first piece of 
disputed evidence, the wood chip from the basement stairs, the State's argument should be regarded as one 
of chain of custody over the evidence. Because the wood chip was introduced in the 1954 trial against Dr. 
Sheppard, the real issue is the integrity of the evidence since it was gathered in 1954. 
-Ohio's courts have routinely recognized that questions regarding the chain of custody of evidence 
are matters that go to the weight of evidence, notto the admissibility of the evidence. In State v. Earle, 120 
Ohio App.3d 457 ( 1997), the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reviewed the procedures where the integrity 
of sealed evidence was questioned. In Earle, the Appellant attempted to exclude evidence that was bagged 
and sealed by police officers and transported to the Lake County Crime Lab. The Appellant's argument was 
based on the fact that the Appel lee could not establish an unbroken chain of custody. The Court of Appeals, 
in holding that the Appel lee had established a sufficient chain of custody, recognized that "[t]he state need 
only establish that it is reasonably certain that substitution, alteration or tampering did not occur; breaks in 
the chain of custody go to the weight, not the admissibility, of [the] evidence." Id. at 4 71, 698 N .E.2d at 449 
(citations omitted). 
Courts have also upheld the admission of evidence where the chain of custody was questionable. 
In State v. Mays, I 08 Ohio App.3d 598, 671 N.E.2d 553 (8th Dist. 1996), the Court reviewed the handling 
of medical records related to a criminal charge of tampering with records. In Mays, the Appellant's medical 
records had been transferred when his dental practice had been sold; the Appellant also demonstrated that 
the purchaser had motive to tamper with the records, since the buyer was suing the Appellant. Id. at 61, 671 
N .E.2d at 566. In reiterating Ohio's long standing rule that the chain of custody could be shown through 
direct testimony or inference, the Court of Appeals held that there was ample evidence for the jury to 
determine the reliability of the evidence's chain of custody. Id.; See also State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 
662, 693 N.E.2d 246, 260 (1998)(in prosecution for numerous offenses, including multiple aggravated 
murders, the state is not required to prove a perfect, unbroken chain of custody). 
In the present case, the State was the original possessor of the disputed evidence. The wood chip 
in question was obtained from the basement stairs of the Sheppard home by Mary Cowan, then an employee 
of the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office. The evidence was introduced in the original trial against Doctor 
Sheppard as State's Exhibit 84. When the evidence was rediscovered, it was still in the condition it was in 
during the 1954 trial. There are photographs demonstrating the condition and labeling of the glass tube; if 
- necessary to establish the reliability of the evidence to the jury, these photographs may be introduced at trial 
to demonstrate the evidence's reliability. Because the State introduced this evidence at the 1954 trial and 
there is proof that the evidence was in its original condition when rediscovered, there is ample support for 
the proposition that the wood chip is the same wood chip introduced as Exhibit 84 in the 1954 trial against 
Doctor Sheppard. Because the evidence falls within the scope of Rule 901, the jury should be able to make 
a determination as to the reliability and credibility of the disputed wood chip. 
-
Furthermore, the State's own failure to maiHtain evidence in a criminal case caused the alleged gap 
in the wood chip's chain of custody. The murder of Marilyn Sheppard remains an unsolved murder. Even 
if the State believed that the murder of Marilyn Sheppard was a closed case following Dr. Sheppard's 
conviction in 1954, the evidence should have been stored and maintained throughout the appeals process in 
the event of a retrial of Dr. Sheppard or the trial of another defendant for the murder of Marilyn Sheppard. 
For whatever reason, the State failed to maintain its own evidence in an unsolved murder. This evidence 
remained in the condition it was in for the 1954 trial of Dr. Sheppard, making it possible for the jury to 
determine what weight to give to the wood chip; even if it had not, and even ifthere is a gap in the evidence's 
chain of custody, the gap is due to the failure of the State to maintain custody of evidence. As such, the 
Defendant should be estopped from using its own failure to bar evidence from being introduced against it 
here. 
The second piece of disputed evidence is the bloodstain taken from Marilyn Sheppard's wardrobe 
door. At trial, the Plaintiff plans to introduce evidence as to the collection and testing of this bloodstain. 
At trial, the State, which has had access to this material since 1997, will have the opportunity to cross 
examine the Plaintiffs expert witnesses on the subject, Dr. Barton Epstein and Dr. Mohammed Tahir. These 
witnesses will be able to testify as to the evidence's authenticity, the reliability of the evidence, and the 
resu Its of their tests. 
In the past, reviewing courts have held that the decision whether or not to hold a separate hearing 
is at the sole discretion of the judge. In interpreting the federal version of Rule 104, the Tenth Circuit Court 
--
of Appeals recently held that there was no abuse of discretion where the trail court declined to hold a 
preliminary evidentiary hearing in the case of convicted Oklahoma City bomber Terry Nichols. United 
States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1263 ( 1999). In the case, Judge Matsch declined to hold an evidentiary 
hearing because the challenged evidence did not involve any new scientific theory and because the testing 
mechanisms were routine. Id. (citations omitted). As such, the court found that it is within the judge's 
discretion whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
In the case at bar, the issue regarding authenticity of the closet stain is about the collection and 
testing of the material. The testing and collection mechanisms used by the Plaintiffs experts are neither new 
nor novel. Id. Furthermore, they are the same tactics used by the State in their collection and analysis of 
evidence. As such, the bloodstain's reliability should be decided by the jury at trial. At trial, both parties 
will have an opportunity to challenge the opposing party's evidence and its reliability, as well as the testing 
mechanisms employed by the Plaintiffs experts. As such, granting the State's motion would be duplicative, 
requiring Plaintiff to present evidence twice for the purposes of the same trial. 
For these reasons, the Defendant's motion in Ii mine to require prohibit the mentioning of these items 
should be denied, and no pre-trial evidentiary hearing pursuant to Ohio R.Evid. 104(A) should be held. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ert (0021948) 
Ge H. Carr (0069372) 
1700 Standard Building 
13 70 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Brief in Opposition to the State's Motion to Exclude 
Specific Items of Physical Evidence has been served on William Mason, Prosecuting Attorney, Justice 
? 
Center, 9th Floor, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 on this 1, f day of December, 1999. 
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